Abstract. Over the past years, we have experienced an increase in the quantity and complexity of malware binaries. This change has been fueled by the introduction of malware generation tools and reuse of different malcode modules. Recent malware appears to be highly modular and less functionally typified. A side-effect of this "composition" of components across different malware types, a growing number of new malware samples cannot be explicitly assigned to traditional classes defined by Anti-Virus (AV) vendors. Indeed, by nature, clustering techniques capture dominant behavior that could be a manifestation of only one of the malware component failing to reveal malware similarities that depend on other, less dominant components and other evolutionary traits. In this paper, we introduce a novel malware behavioral commonality analysis scheme that takes into consideration component-wise grouping, called behavioral mapping. Our effort attempts to shed light to malware behavioral relationships and go beyond simply clustering the malware into a family. To this end, we implemented a method for identifying soft clusters and reveal shared malware components and traits. Using our method, we demonstrate that a malware sample can belong to several groups (clusters), implying sharing of its respective components with other samples from the groups. We performed experiments with a large corpus of real-world malware data-sets and identified that we can successfully highlight malware component relationships across the existing AV malware families and variants.
Introduction
The recent discoveries of sophisticated malware including Stuxnet [4] and Flame [9] demonstrate the evolution of the mainstream malware techniques to stealthy, precise cyber weapons aimed to disrupt critical infrastructure and exfiltrate sensitive information. To avoid mainstream Anti-Viruses (AVs) and intrusion detection systems, adversaries employ code obfuscation including polymorphism and metamorphism techniques to enshroud their malware attacks. At the same time, a new family of malware generator tools have gained popularity by offering capabilities for customization. The use of malware "components" has become evident with the recent leaks of malware source code (e.g. SpyEye [6] and Zeus [16] ) that pointed to a modular structure of the malware development process, incorporating independent components into a new malware build. This observation indicates two implications: (i) modern malware should be viewed as a set of functional components; (ii) the number and diversity of functionally distinct components used in modern malware is rather limited.
Currently, the AV industry categorizes malware based on main malicious activities such as virus, worm, spyware, fakeAV and adware. As a result, malware samples were labeled and grouped based on one component, e.g., the one with the most threatening behavior (Kaspersky AV) [10] . In an attempt to account for expanding malware behavioral variety, several major AV companies adopted more detailed, tree-based malware classification [11] . Unfortunately, even this analysis is not adequate for labeling modern malware having multiple components attributed to various fixed types defined by the classification tree. For instance, bot frameworks offer a wide range of malicious functionality from selfreplication to keylogger and backdoor, which traditionally belong to different malware types. Hence, MAEC project, the recent initiative of universal malware classification, proposes labeling and grouping malware based on the set of individual behaviors (components) to avoid class members inconsistencies [12] .
On the other hand, researchers have proposed several methods that leverage various machine learning and clustering algorithms to group malware [8, 2, 15, 1] . Although accurate when they come to single family, these methods fall short for modular malware: they obtain hard (exact) clusters that imply that each sample is attributed to one cluster (group). By nature, these clustering methods process totality of samples behavior and capture only dominant behavior that could be a manifestation of only one component. However, in practice, malware samples may share components with relatively small behavioral trace (footprint). Typical clustering will not reveal smaller, but potentially equally important, shared malicious components. Particularly, it may come short of exposing relationship between older malware and newer mixed samples.
In this paper, we propose to address the challenge of grouping malware with respect to components. In order to achieve component-oriented grouping, we developed a novel approach for building soft clusters that expose behavioral commonalities characterized as component traits. In our approach, a malware sample is decomposed to identified behavioral components and thus it can belong to several groups (clusters). Figure 1 illustrates the advantage of soft clustering for component-based malware grouping conceptually. The figure depicts three samples, each having two components. It could be seen that hard clustering cannot properly group samples with respect to components -sample 1 and 3 share components with sample 2 but not with each other. This component-wise orthogonality of samples 1 and 3 would render hard clusters to singletons (e.g. the sample 1 and 2 are clustered together, but sample 3 is excluded). In contrast, soft clustering allows for grouping samples appropriately as shown by dashed regions based on their behavioral similarities. Typical clustering utilizes behavioral commonalities across the totality of the malware sample creating "hard clusters" that fail to capture smaller traits and behavioral sharing. On the other hand, "soft clusters" are designed to reveal all behavioral similarities, however small.
At a high level, the main concept behind our approach is called behavioral mapping, a process of rapid analysis of the commonalities between malware behavioral traces across large malware data sets. The behavioral map of a malware sample is produced by projecting its observed runtime behavior to the runtime behavior of another reference malware sample. The produced map is in essence a feature space defined by the behavioral projections and serves as a visualization mechanism for commonality sharing across analyzed samples. In our analysis, we generate malware behavioral maps and use a set of feature spaces to form soft clusters representing behavioral commonalities among samples.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. Component-based malware grouping. We developed a novel approach for component-oriented, behavior-based malware clustering. We leverage what we call "soft clustering" to capture complex malware relationships with respect to all observed behavioral commonalities.
2. Commonality analysis and visualization. We introduced a behavioral mapping technique that allows for fast commonality identification, analysis, and visualization. Also such a map forms a feature space for sample clustering.
3. Evaluation and real malware relationship interpretation. We evaluated our system on substantial set of real-world malware -1,727 unique samples. The experiments demonstrated that existing approaches for malware classification based on dominant functionality, i.e., AV labels [11] , does not reveal real relationship between malware with respect to shared activity. Using our approach of "soft clusters", we were able to reveal malware relationships beyond basic family classification.
Behavioral Mapping
Behavioral mapping is the process of analyzing the commonalities between malware behavioral traces. Behavioral traces are sequences of system events collected from malware runtime observations. These traces are analyzed with the goal of identifying the commonalities which are subsequences that are shared among samples. These commonalities can lead to the exposure of shared components. A behavioral mapping is produced in 3 steps: (i) Projection: Sequences of malware traces are projected onto a reference in the given domain. The reference can be another sequence of a sample or a constructed sequence of interest to the analyst. Projection is composed as a binary feature vector of length equal to reference length. It represents common behavioral sequences between a reference sample and the projected sample. (ii) Soft Clustering: Samples are clustered in the feature space defined by the projections on the reference. This provides an ordering of the samples as well as grouping of samples according to the similarity of their projections. (iii) Visualization: The behavioral map is presented as a bitmap of projections, viewed as commonalties, represented by rows and arranged according to clusters. Each row shows the shared behavior(shaded rectangles) of one malware sample with respect to the reference. We also visualize how much of the sample's observed behavior(sample coverage) is shared with the reference using an additional column on the map.
It is worth noting that this mapping approach can be used for analysis of any kind of behavioral sequence data irrespective of the abstraction level. In this work we chose to use only windows system events that could be monitored via Event Tracing for Windows(ETW) facility. Common behavioral sequences are identified by suffix tree based methods [18, 5] . Inspection of behavioral maps can reveal interesting properties about the shared behavior of samples and their similarities.
Commonality Analysis via Iterative Behavioral Mapping
During the analysis of a corpus of malware samples, a single behavioral mapping will not suffice to elicit all the components present in the sample set. In a single mapping with one reference, all the samples similar to the reference or those that share a significant commonality with the reference show up together in groups. But, the rest of the samples which have low coverage remain mostly unexplored. They may have components they share between themselves but not with the reference. Therefore, these samples should be projected on to a new reference.
To address unexplored samples and identify all commonalities, we developed an iterative behavior mapping scheme that leverages soft clustering approach for commonality analysis and identification. To this end, samples are assigned to clusters in a fuzzy fashion (i.e multiple cluster assignments for the commonalities identified across multiple iterations). Such clusters represent commonalities that can enable component identification, e.g. via additional semantic analysis. To quantify the progress of commonality discovery in samples, we use the following metrics for a given sample: (i) sample coverage -portion (%) of sample behavior shared with the reference as defined by the projection; (ii) reference coverage -portion (%) of reference behavior shared with the sample as defined by the projection. Figure 2 shows the flowchart of a procedure implementing our ap- proach. The formal representation of the procedure is given in Algorithm 1. In each iteration, one of the samples from the pool of remaining samples is randomly chosen as a next reference. Next, we generate projections for each sample with respect to the selected reference. The generated projections are then ordered according to the result of Hierarchical clustering. The order of samples is the same as the leaves of the tree generated by hierarchical clustering. For ordering the projections(step 3), we first generate a pairwise distance matrix for all the projections. For this, we use a metric called shared string metric(SSM ) defined between every pair of sample projections as follows:
where L(A), L(B) are sum of lengths of all shared strings of A, B respectively with reference. AN DSimilarity(A, B) = sum of lengths of all strings jointly shared by A and B with reference. This metric captures the similarity of two projections with respect to a given reference. It is computed by the AN D operation on the corresponding projection vectors both of which have the same length of the reference. Next, Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering (HAC) is used as a method of clustering the SSM distance matrix. We used agglomerative nesting algorithm with wards linkage method. Agglomerative algorithms start with each of n samples as a separate cluster and iteratively merge the two nearest clusters in n − 1 steps to produce a single hierarchical clustering. Wards linkage method is preferred over other linkage methods because it achieved higher cophenetic correlation with the input distance matrix in our experiments.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Behavioral Mapping.
Inputs: S : samples Ts : sample coverage threshold Definitions: P : pool of remaining samples R : List of references Clji : j th cluster in i th iteration P ri : set of projections of samples in the i th iteration Coi: set of coverages of samples in the i th iteration Co ki : coverage of sample k in the i th iteration Cci: set of cumulative coverages of samples in all iteration until ith Cc ki : cumulative coverage of sample k after i iterations ri : reference in the i th iteration si : i th malware sample p ki : projection of the k th sample in the i th iteration Initialization : P = S initial pool is the whole set of samples i = 1 1: procedure Iterative Projection(S, P, Ts)
To perform iterative projection 2: 3:
while (|P | ≥ 2) do sample pool size is at least 2 4:
ri ←PICK REFERENCE(R, P, i) 5:
P ← P − ri remove reference from pool 6:
∀s k ∈ P : pr ki ←Project Sample(s k ,ri) projection of the k th sample on the reference 7:
P ri = {pr ki | ∀k = 1 to |P | } all projections 8: 9:
\* cluster all projections *\ 10:
ClusterHAC(P ri) generates hierarchical clustering of projections 11:
for all s k ∈ P do 12:
UPDATE COVERAGE(Cc ki ,Co ki ,pr ki ) update sample coverage 13:
if Cc ki ≥ Ts then 14:
end
i ← i + 1 19: end procedure
In step 4, the dendrogram generated in step 3 is partitioned into separate clusters. These clusters of projections essentially represent soft clusters of corresponding samples. To partition the projections into separate clusters (step 4), we use the Dynamic hybrid tree cut method [13] with minimum cluster size set to 1. The dynamic hybrid tree cut method performs better than fixed height cutting for partitioning a hierarchical clustering result into separate clusters because it incorporates the tree structure information into the partitioning method. After partitioning, samples within each cluster have comparable reference coverage as seen on the reordered behavioral maps. But, consistent sample coverage is not guaranteed (i.e projections look similar but samples themselves need not be similar). In the last step, we assess each sample's coverage and remove highly covered samples from further iterations. Based on the Threshold T s set in Algorithm 1, we eliminate samples that have accumulated coverage above the threshold. This step reduces the pool size for the next iteration.
We evaluated our approach on a real-world data set containing 1,727 samples from seven families. Table 1 shows the distribution of samples in our sample set according to their Kaspersky AV family labels. In section 3.1 we present two use cases of behavioral mapping for analysing variants of a single family and multiple families respectively. In Section 3.2 we present the evaluation of the Iterative behavioral mapping scheme described in Section 2.2. 
Behavioral Map Use Cases
Intra-family Mapping : In this experiment, we use behavioral mapping to illustrate the properties of the variants of a given family. We call this intra-family map because all samples belong to the same family. Figure 3 shows the Behavioral Map for 92 samples of the Trojan Jorik Family (Kaspersky AV definition). We randomly selected a sample which had label Trojan.Win32.Jorik.SpyEyes.pq as a reference. The column adjacent to the projection represents Sample coverage. The projections are clustered into 7 clusters according to their similarities. From the labels (on Y-axis), we can see that the Behavioral map reveals clusters of samples that are consistent with Kaspersky AV labels( i.e samples belonging to same variant are clustered together). We also observe that length of shared behaviors is invariant across many samples. These are likely to be caused by shared components. It can be observed from the map that several components exclusively belong to certain variants. In Figure 3 , we can see that component marked C1 occurs in most samples except the Fraud variant and component marked C2 is never present in the Gbot variant. From the column showing sample coverages, we can observe that the samples with highest coverage belong to the same variant as the reference (SpyEyes). From the low coverages of other samples we can infer that they exhibit behaviors not shared with SpyEyes variant. Inter-family Mapping -Composite Reference : In this experiment, we produce a behavioral map for a set of 337 samples representative of seven families. To analyze sample relationship across families we use composite reference in mapping. The composite reference is constructed in a supervised manner by randomly selecting a sample from each of the 6 families presented in the mapped sample set. Figure 4 shows the produced behavioral map. As indicated in Figure 4 , some samples are highly covered by commonalties. High sample coverage and high commonality density indicates that samples are highly similar to the reference sample (e.g. cluster 4). High sample coverage, but commonalities themselves are short and scattered across the projections may indicate that these samples did not execute real malicious components exposing only typical (normal) system activity (e.g. dll loading), which we treat as noise from clustering perspective (e.g. cluster 11, 12) . Low sample coverage indicates that these samples do not share much of behavior with the reference and should be projected onto another sample (e.g. cluster 6).
As depicted in Figure 4 , the map provides significant visual and structural information for inter-sample commonality analysis. While the gain from each mapping of a sample set is subjective on the selected reference point, producing multiple mappings with various references or using the composite reference technique would increase its value for an expert from an analytical standpoint. In Figure 4 , vertical lines separate the 6 individual behavior sequences. From this perspective, it could be seen that samples in cluster #7 share commonalties with various samples from various families. At the same time, samples in cluster #1 share almost entire observed behavior with the constituent sample reference II, meaning that they belong to a single highly consistent family. 
Commonality Analysis (Iterative clustering)
In this section we perform malware commonality analysis for 1727 sample set using proposed Iterative Mapping method (Algorithm 1) 1 . In the experiment, we set coverage threshold T s = 90%, which means that the algorithm must process at least 90% of sample behavior. In spite of the high coverage threshold, the algorithm took only 38 iterations and identified 303 commonalities(soft clusters).
In Figure 5 , we present the result of entire iteration process for a subset of samples (limited by visualization space). The x axis represents the concatenation of all commonalities found across iterations in increasing order. The y axis shows 337 samples arranged in the order of the number of iterations required to uncover sample behavior, i.e. achieve coverage threshold. The vertical partitions mark the end of iterations. It can be seen that more commonalities are revealed in the earlier iterations and the number of commonalities decreases in subsequent iterations. The commonalities also occur in larger groups in earlier iterations due to the higher number of samples in the pool. This figure essentially provides an approximate summary of the entire process across iterations. It also reveals groups of samples that share commonalities and are covered together. malware samples. The columns of the heat map represent the commonalities found across iterations. The rows divide each of the associated sample groups according to the family labels. The intensity of the gray scale color represents the purity of commonality sharing with respect to the malware families. If a cell is colored black it means the total absence of the component in the corresponding family. On the other hand, white indicates that the component is exclusive to the family. Intermediate shades of grey indicate the various proportions of families sharing the component. The same information is also presented by the horizontal trace across the rows. It can be observed that some commonalities are exclusive for particular families, while others are shared across the families. This is indicative of the component sharing nature of different families. For example, it can be seen that samples from Trojan.win32.Refroso and Trojan.win32.Buzus families likely share some components (manifested as commonalities) . At the same time, samples from Trojan.win32.Refroso and Trojan-Spy-win32.Zbot families potentially share some other components.
In Figure 7 , we present the graph-based visualization of the clustering results. It shows the structural relationship between samples from the commonality perspective. The graph shows two types of nodes: (i) samples and (ii) references of maps over all iterations. The sample nodes are colored according to their Kaspersky Antivirus label. The references are plotted in red. Semantically, the graph shows cluster membership and members proximity with respect to shared behavior (components). The samples that are grouped together are connected to the same reference representing shared commonality. The distance between references on the graph is proportional to SSM similarity described in 2.2 . The distance between samples and the corresponding reference is proportional to their coverage (high sample coverage means low distance). For the sake of clarity, in Figure 7 , we minimized the number of links by considering only the most significant components. It could be seen that some samples are all at the same distance to the reference and are homogeneously colored. These samples are similar to each other and belong to the same Kaspersky family. On the other hand other clusters have samples from different families, this also shows the inter-family behavior sharing property. Also, these clusters have samples at different distances from their respective references, this means that they share commonalities of different degrees with respect to each other.
To conclude our findings, we evaluated performance of hard clustering with behavioral maps. To build hard clusters we used only one map providing the sufficient coverage of samples, in contrast to several maps contributing total coverage as with soft clusters. To this end, samples that are not covered above minimum coverage in any iteration remain unassigned and continue to be in the sample pool for the next iteration. We observed there are many samples which were not covered beyond threshold in any single iteration and therefore not assigned to any hard cluster, however the same exact samples were almost completely covered by soft clustering approach and as a result assigned to multiple groups. This illustrates the problem with one-one (pairwise) comparison of samples for clustering. Though there is a component sharing, the sharing behavior is not captured by pairwise methods. This experiment shows that sample behavioral sequences are indeed composed of distinct behavioral sub sequences (commonalities), that are shared with other samples. All of these commonalities cannot be extracted jointly in any single pairwise comparison. Finally, the iterative behavioral mapping scheme avoids O(n 2 ) comparisons between all samples to extract these commonalities. It took only 38 mapping iterations to reveal commonalities and group all of the 1727 malware samples while the vast majority of the samples were analyzed and clustered during the first 10 iterations.
Related Work
There has been a great deal of research on development of dynamic malware analysis techniques. Egele et al. [3] provide a detailed survey of various existing dynamic malware analysis systems and a comparison of their analysis inputs and capabilities. Jacob et al. [7] present a taxonomy of behavioral detection methods according to the reasoning techniques deployed in them. While dynamic malware analysis allows for extracting samples behavior, our work is dedicated to processing the behavior.
Malware clustering in the behavioral domain was addressed in various publications [8] , [2] , [15] , [1] and [14] . Most of the proposed approaches utilize standard clustering algorithms and focused on selection of appropriate feature space and distance metric. By nature, such clustering approaches have a limitation called "dominance" effect, as the result the hard clusters may not reveal smaller but equally important malicious components.
Bayer et al. [2] , Rieck et al. [15] and Jang et al. [8] all work with behavioral profiles generated by processing execution reports and generating feature sets.
These works focus on scalable clustering by incorporating suitable approximations. BitShred [8] performs feature hashing and co-clustering to reveal semantic relationships between families. Their method requires preselected feature extraction and operates on vector data. Also, due to co-clustering it could not be applied to ordered sequence data for semantic analysis. Our system is feature order sensitive and preserving, allowing for direct analysis of behavior data, such as operation/function call sequences of dynamic length.
Rieck et al. [15] and Trinius et al. [17] extract behavioral profiles of malware samples from CWSandbox reports. They generate feature vectors based on n-grams from these reports and perform clustering to find groupings(class discovery) and classification(using SVM) to assign unknown malware to known classes. Because our system is not n-gram feature space based, it is scalable for use with any sequence data irrespective of the alphabet size. Trinius et al. [17] visualize the CWSandbox reports in the form of treemapping and thread graphs, they perform visual malware clustering by generating tree maps for samples and evaluating against AV labels. Wagener et al. [19] and Bailey et al. [1] tackle the problem of automated classification of malware based on behavioral analysis using normalized compression distance(NCD) metrics. Ye. et al. [20] proposed an ensemble method to generate consensus of multiple clusterings using static features of unpacked malware.
Conclusions
Malware classification techniques are not new and there has been a lot of research into placing malware samples into different families including work by AV vendors. We focused on the problem of component oriented malware grouping. We used our "soft clustering" approach to reveal component sharing across malware samples that belong to different families according to traditional grouping. We experimentally demonstrated that existing approach for malware grouping based on dominant functionality and fixed classification tree, as used in AV industry, does not reveal relationships between malware with respect to shared behavior. We introduced behavioral mapping approach that iteratively builds a range of features which form soft clusters representing shared component traits. Furthermore, we used visualization for a set of samples to illustrate the structural commonality distribution across AV families. Finally, our experiments show the scalability and computational efficiency of our component analysis scheme on a real set of 1727 malware samples.
